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Abstract
Background: Biosafety is a key aspect in the international Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition,
which offers student teams an amazing opportunity to pursue their own research projects in the field of Synthetic
Biology. iGEM projects often involve the creation of genetically engineered bacterial strains. To minimize the risks
associated with bacterial release, a variety of biosafety systems were constructed, either to prevent survival of
bacteria outside the lab or to hinder horizontal or vertical gene transfer.
Main body: Physical containment methods such as bioreactors or microencapsulation are considered the first
safety level. Additionally, various systems involving auxotrophies for both natural and synthetic compounds have
been utilized by iGEM teams in recent years. Combinatorial systems comprising multiple auxotrophies have been
shown to reduced escape frequencies below the detection limit. Furthermore, a number of natural toxin-antitoxin
systems can be deployed to kill cells under certain conditions. Additionally, parts of naturally occurring toxin-
antitoxin systems can be used for the construction of ‘kill switches’ controlled by synthetic regulatory modules,
allowing control of cell survival. Kill switches prevent cell survival but do not completely degrade nucleic acids.
To avoid horizontal gene transfer, multiple mechanisms to cleave nucleic acids can be employed, resulting in ‘self-
destruction’ of cells. Changes in light or temperature conditions are powerful regulators of gene expression and
could serve as triggers for kill switches or self-destruction systems. Xenobiology-based containment uses
applications of Xeno-DNA, recoded codons and non-canonical amino acids to nullify the genetic information
of constructed cells for wild type organisms. A ‘minimal genome’ approach brings the opportunity to reduce
the genome of a cell to only genes necessary for survival under lab conditions. Such cells are unlikely to
survive in the natural environment and are thus considered safe hosts. If suitable for the desired application,
a shift to cell-free systems based on Xeno-DNA may represent the ultimate biosafety system.
Conclusion: Here we describe different containment approaches in synthetic biology, ranging from
auxotrophies to minimal genomes, which can be combined to significantly improve reliability. Since the iGEM
competition greatly increases the number of people involved in synthetic biology, we will focus especially on
biosafety systems developed and applied in the context of the iGEM competition.
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Background
Safety approaches in synthetic biology are frequently dis-
tinguished into mechanisms of biosecurity or biosafety.
However, many methods can only be distinguished at a
theoretical level into biosafety or biosecurity [1]. Here,
we focus on biosafety, defined as the combination of all
preventive measures against accidental infection with, or
release of, genetically engineered organisms into the
environment [2]. Nevertheless, some of the presented
mechanisms can also contribute to biosecurity, defined
as the protection of biological systems against an
intended misuse [3].
Recombinant DNA technology has been applied since
1973 to modify the genetic information of cells for scien-
tific as well as for economic purposes [4]. However, this
technology poses risks if applied carelessly [5] or with
deleterious intent [6–8]. This risk has long been recog-
nized, and multiple safety regulations have been pro-
posed to prevent harm to humans, animals, and the
environment [9, 10].
As Escherichia coli became a model organism in mo-
lecular biology and biotechnology, the development of
safety strains was of high interest [11]. For example, E.
coli K12 MG1655 [12, 13] and E. coli B derivatives like
REL606 and BL21 (DE3) are safety strains [14]
commonly used for molecular cloning and heterologous
gene expression [15–19]. Due to several mutations, these
strains are no longer able to compete with wild type
strains within the human gut [5, 20]. More sophisticated
strains have been developed, including dedicated
biosafety approaches like the relA deletion in combination
with a conditional phoA expression [21, 22], as described
in the next chapter. The combination of different
precautions may have successfully prevented any accidents
involving genetically modified organisms (GMOs) during
the last four decades [2, 23–25]. Today, the handling of
GMOs is strictly controlled for multiple reasons, including
ecological and health considerations [2, 26, 27], but also
the protection of intellectual property [28].
However, the demand for novel biosafety systems is
still high, due to the spread of genetic engineering cap-
abilities which in turn is facilitated by the growing num-
ber of people involved in the field of synthetic biology.
Students participating in the iGEM [29] competition
have contributed significantly to the synthetic biology
toolbox [30–43]. The increased availability of genome
sequences [12, 44] as well as an ever-increasing number
of sequenced bacterial genomes could enhance the dis-
covery and implementation of innovative safety systems.
We will describe general biosafety mechanisms along
with advanced systems developed within this competi-
tion. It is our intention to provide an overview of the
applied concepts as well as the completely implemented
and characterized systems. Since the deletion of an
essential gene is probably the most basic mechanism, we
will start with the description of auxotrophies. Released
cells with failing auxotrophy systems could be stopped
by the activation of kill switches. Activation of such
mechanism should kill the cell, but the nucleic acids are
still present, requiring a self-destruction of the genetic
information to prevent horizontal gene transfer (HGT).
Given that all known life on earth is based on the same
biochemistry, cells are composed of common materials
like proteins, sugars, lipids, and nucleic acids. Although
the sequence of nucleotides and amino acids varies
within higher layer molecules, the basal molecules are
shared across all species. A common genetic code allows
the exchange of genetic information between different
species through HGT. In general, HGT might not be
beneficial for a specific species [45] but is assumed to
maintain an overall unity of life by preventing changes
in the genetic code [46]. Therefore, central signal and
metabolic pathways are shared between distantly related
species, while additional pathways are specific to certain
taxonomic groups. Interesting in terms of biosafety are
rare cases, where replicating systems escaped this system
and modified their genetic code [47–49]. Modifications
to this universal genetic code pose a powerful biosafety
mechanism [50]. Therefore, xenobiology-based contain-
ment is another way to prevent the successful transfer of
information from another species. Sensors for light,
temperature, pH, UV or other physical parameters can
be used as triggers for biosafety systems. Avoiding issues
of vertical gene transfer (VGT) through cell division, cell
free systems seem to be a well suited biosafety approach.
In combination with xenobiology, cell free systems could
efficiently minimize the risk of HGT and VGT. Finally,
we aim to describe the design of an optimized biosafety
system by integration of different mechanisms, which
consequently could be referred to as a synthetic bio-
safety system [51].
Auxotrophy
One of the earliest methods applied for biocontainment
was auxotrophy, introduced either by random mutation
or targeted engineering [52]. In respect to biosafety,
auxotrophic organisms are not able to synthesize one or
more compounds required for survival or replication, so
the missing components must be provided externally
[53]. Therefore, the organism cannot survive outside a
controlled environment, such as a bioreactor. Research
on auxotrophic strains dates back to 1941, when Beadly
and Tatum characterized a strain of Neurospora sitophila
without pyridoxine [54]. The first construction and ap-
plication of an auxotroph E. coli strain for biosafety rea-
sons was developed in 1977 by Curtiss and colleagues
[52], who developed the strain χ1776, which requires
diaminopimelic acid (DAP) and thymine or thymidine
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for growth. Indeed, many prominent laboratory E. coli
strains are auxotrophic mutants [55]. Over the years,
auxotropy-based systems have been developed further and
successfully improved with regards to reducing the escape
frequency [53] (the escape frequency describes the prob-
ability of an organism bypassing the containment mea-
sures and is usually determined by quantification of
escape mutants found in a defined cell number [56]), with
an increasing number of studies reporting escape frequen-
cies (Table 2) below the detection limit (e.g. [57, 58]).
Auxotrophy-based systems are manifold in nature, with
different hosts (e.g. E. coli or other bacteria, plants, or
fungi) and various possible dependencies, most commonly
for amino acids or vitamins.
Strains auxotrophic for proteinogenic amino acids
The dependency of engineered organisms on one or
multiple naturally occurring amino acids has been used
in many studies to improve biosafety via containment or
replacement of problematic functions. A prime example
for the latter is the substitution of antibiotic resistance
markers on plasmids. These standard tools in genetic
engineering traditionally contain an antibiotic resistance
gene as a selection marker, which further ensures plasmid
maintenance. This is potentially hazardous, as the
resistance genes could be released into the environment
[59–61]. As an alternative to antibiotic selection markers,
the auxotrophic E. coli strain M15 carries an inactive glyA
gene, which is necessary for intracellular glycine synthesis
[59]. The antibiotic-free expression system utilizes the
M15 strain with a constructed plasmid providing the glyA
gene and thereby preventing plasmid loss. A similar ap-
proach was used in the modified E. coli strain JM83 auxo-
trophic for proline and a complementing vector supplying
the proBA genes necessary for the proline biosynthetic
pathway [62]. Antibiotic resistance-free systems have also
been used as a safe method for vaccine production and
are not limited to E. coli. An example is the cattle vaccine
Brucella abortus mutant strain (RB51) with non-func-
tional 3-isopropylmalate dehydrogenase (leuB), which is
essential for biosynthesis of leucine [60]. By adding a plas-
mid carrying the wild type leuB to the leucine-auxotrophic
strain, the B. abortus strain is able to survive and the cor-
responding plasmid is maintained due to selective pres-
sure. The resulting system is a biologically safe vaccine
system, as the B. abortus mutant strain induces immune
responses through a plasmid containing the gene encod-
ing the desired antigen, but no antibiotic resistance gene,
which could potentially spread to the microbial flora of an
animal. In 2012, a system was engineered that supported
the usage of the duckweed Lemna for the production of
vaccines and therapeutics [63]. An avian influenza vaccine
antigen was successfully expressed in the system contain-
ing an isoleucine auxotroph strain of Lemna. Particularly,
threonine deaminase expression necessary for the isoleu-
cine biosynthesis had been inactivated in a system con-
taining an isoleucine auxotroph strain of Lemna, which
was then supplemented with isoleucine to enable growth.
Strains auxotrophic for other natural components
A different biosafety approach is to prevent an organism
from building a cell wall by means of engineered auxot-
rophy. For example, D-alanine is an essential component
of the peptidoglycan layer, since it is one of the mole-
cules necessary for the cross-linkage of the polysacchar-
ide chains [64, 65]. L-alanine can be converted to
D-alanine by two different alanine racemases in E. coli,
one being encoded by alr, the other one by dadX [66].
In Corynebacteriaceae, only the alr gene is present,
which was deleted in Corynebacterium glutamicum [65]
and Mycobacterium smegmatis [67, 68]. While Tauch et
al. [65] successfully created a D-alanine auxotroph and
subsequently used a plasmid-borne alr gene to replace
an antibiotic resistance marker, Chacon et al. [67] found
that M. smegmatis mutants with inserted inactivated
D-alanine racemase gene were still able to grow without
supplied D-alanine.
Focusing on the aspartate semialdehyde dehydrogen-
ase (asd) gene, an antibiotic resistance gene free plasmid
Salmonella enteritidis “ghost” (i.e. an empty cell enve-
lope possessing intact bacterial surface structures and in-
tegrated antigen proteins) has been developed as a safe
vaccine against infectious diseases in chicken [69]. The
strategy was to delete the asd gene, which encodes
aspartate ß-semialdehyde dehydrogenase (Asd), an
enzyme located at the root of biosynthesis of the
aspartate-derived amino acids lysine, threonine and
methionine. Asd is also involved in forming the precursor
for the production of diaminopimelic acid (DAP), which
in turn is necessary to build the cell wall structures in
most bacteria. As a complement, a plasmid carrying the
asd gene and a lysis system (pJHL101) for production of
the “ghost” was constructed. The resulting strain was
tested as a vaccine in chickens and shown to elicit
substantial immune responses [69].
Additionally, an auxotrophic E. coli strain has been
engineered by inactivating the chromosomal quinolinic
acid phosphoribosyltransferase (QAPRTase) gene, a key
enzyme in the nicotinamide adenine dinucleotide (NAD)
synthesis pathway [61]. Thus, an antibiotic-free plasmid
selection system has been created by complementing the
system with a plasmid containing the QAPRTase gene of
the mouse. The resulting antibiotic-free selection system
was the first to use a vertebrate gene and the strain can
be maintained in complex (LB) or minimal media.
Hirota et al. developed a novel biocontainment strat-
egy based on a dependency on phosphite [70]. By dis-
rupting all endogenous Pi and organic Pi transporters
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and by producing the transporter HtxBCDE, as well as
HtxA and PtxD, the researchers engineered an E. coli
strain dependent on phosphite or hypophosphite.
HtxBCDE, a transporter from Pseudomonas stutzeri
WM88, is capable of transporting phosphite and hypo-
phosphite but not phosphate. Production of the hypo-
phosphite dioxygenase HtxA and of the phosphite
dehydrogenase PtxD allowed utilization of hypopho-
sphite and phosphite as sole sources of Pi. When tested
on non-permissive growth medium, no escape mutants
were detected after 21 days. An escape frequency of
1.94 × 10− 13 was achieved, which is extremely low com-
pared to other biocontainment approaches (Table 2).
Examples of natural containment systems also include a
strategy to treat inflammatory bowel disease in humans by
a genetically modified Lactococcus lactis strain. The strain
was altered by replacing thyA, the gene encoding thymidy-
late synthase, which is essential for growth of the bacter-
ium, with a human interleukin-10 gene [71]. The resulting
strain produces human interleukin-10, which is used as a
therapeutic for inflammatory bowel disease. Furthermore,
it is dependent on thymidine or thymine for survival, thus
providing a biologically contained system for clinical treat-
ment in humans. The strain has been successfully tested
in a clinical trial [72]. Specifically, no severe side effects
were detected in the patients, and the thyA-deficient or-
ganism was found to be unable to replicate without proper
supplementation.
To increase performance, auxotrophic systems can be
combined to engineer strains with multiple auxotrophies
in order to further improve containment capability, such
as the synthetic E. coli auxotrophs with ligand-
dependent essential genes (SLiDE) [73], which uses a
mutation approach demonstrated by the Karanicolas lab
[74]. The resulting strains can only survive if they are
supplied with the low-cost ligand benzothiazole, enab-
ling the growth through the gain-of function of an es-
sential protein in which an aromatic amino acid residue
was mutated to a glycine. For further improved contain-
ment, multiple SLiDE alleles were incorporated in E.
coli. While escape frequencies (Table 2) for strains with
a single SLiDE allele ranged between 8 × 10− 4 and 3 ×
10− 9, incorporating two alleles resulted in improved
escape frequencies of up to 5 × 10− 10, and building in
three SLiDE alleles lead to undetectable escape frequen-
cies below 3 × 10− 11 [74].
Still, even combining several auxotrophies for natural
compounds required by the organisms cannot overcome
a major drawback inherent in this approach: The neces-
sary compounds can potentially occur in the natural
environment, compromising the safety mechanism.
Hence, compounds which do not naturally occur in the
environment have been considered as a complement for
auxotrophs.
Evaluation of auxotrophic strains for biosafety purposes
In conclusion, auxotrophic GMOs are simple and
cost-efficient biocontainment systems with a variety of
possible applications. Complementing substances can be
provided via the growth media, and multiple auxotro-
phies further reduce escape risks. However, auxotrophic
systems suffer from substantial drawbacks, such as pos-
sible metabolic cross-feeding, toxic overexpression, and
loss of function due to decreased selection pressure in a
heterogeneous natural environment (for a summary see
[75]). Therefore, instead of relying on an auxotrophy
system alone, they are often part of a complex multi-
layered biosafety system, such as SafeGuard [76] or Gen-
eGuard [32]. In the GeneGuard plasmid system (Fig. 1),
auxotrophies based on translocation of the essential
genes thyA or dapA to a plasmid location were com-
bined with a conditional origin of replication and
toxin-antitoxin system to engineer a host-plasmid mu-
tual dependency [32].
Auxotrophy systems in the iGEM competition
Compared to their prominence in research, the imple-
mentations of auxotrophic strains in iGEM projects have
been relatively rare, which is in part due to the fact that
the iGEM foundation does not collect and provide such
genetically modified strains, making it necessary for the
iGEM teams to either create them themselves or obtain
them from other sources.
A successful implementation of an auxotrophic strain
for a biosafety system had been accomplished by team
Bielefeld-Germany 2013 [77]. The team created a
biosafety system composed of three independent layers,
one of which being a D-alanine auxotrophy, established
by deleting both racemase genes, alr and dadX. The
team showed that cells grown on media without
D-alanine supplemented or not carrying a plasmid-
bound alanine racemase (BBa_K1172901) were unable to
grow. Bielefeld-CeBiTec 2014 [78] adapted the system
for an antibiotic-free selection, hence eliminating the
problems resulting from extensive use of antibiotics in
laboratories. This underlines the multifaceted possible
applications of auxotrophies.
Other teams have conceptually considered auxotrophic
strains for their projects, whilst not implementing these
themselves. Team BYU Provo 2014 [79], for example,
worked with the bacterium Nitrosospira multiformis in
the context of wastewater treatment and identified serine
as being abundant in the bioreactor/sedimentation tank,
but not in the waterways. Therefore, it was proposed that
deletion of serA from N. multiformis would result in a de-
pendency for serine, hence making growth outside the
bioreactor or sedimentation tank improbable.
The biosafety system for Synechocystis sp. suggested by
team Amsterdam 2015 [80] is based on an arginine and
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proline auxotrophy. To implement the auxotrophies, de-
letion of argH for arginine and proC for proline auxotro-
phy was proposed. Since the team could not finish the
desired work in time, no results regarding the effective-
ness of a combination of an arginine and proline auxot-
rophy are available.
Kill switch: plasmid retention and cell destruction
While auxotrophies prevent a continuous survival or
replication of cells, biological kill switches are applied to
prevent the survival of a cell immediately. Typically,
these biosafety systems make use of bacteriolytic toxin-
antitoxin systems (TA) of different complexities. So far,
five different types of TA systems have been identified
and described in the literature [81].
Antisense RNA meditates the inhibition in type I sys-
tems [82, 83]. Besides the sense strand transcription of
the toxin gene, the sequence of the reverse strand is par-
tially transcribed as well, leading to a complementary
RNA called an antitoxin. This antisense transcript binds
to the sense transcript and prevents the translation by
blocking off the ribosome or by promoting the degrad-
ation of the mRNA, respectively [84, 85]. Famous exam-
ples of type I TA systems are hok-sok and similar
systems like pndA-pndB and symR-symE [86–89].
Type I TA systems have not been commonly applied in
the iGEM competition in the context of biosafety (Table 1).
Most teams have integrated type I TA systems for plasmid
maintenance and as an alternative for antibiotic resistance
cassettes. Team NTU Taida 2012 [90] used the Hok-Sok
homologue SrnB-SrnC (BBa_K817015) to ensure plasmid
maintenance and to kill cells after plasmid loss. University
of Maryland 2015 [91] investigated the ability to use
Hok-Sok (BBa_K1783001) for antibiotic-free plasmid
maintenance.
Type II systems are based on two genes that are usu-
ally adjacent, are oriented head to tail, and form an op-
eron. Systems characterized as type II TA systems
include ccdA-ccdB, kis-kid, parDE, phd-doc, mazE-mazF,
and axe-txe [92–97]. The encoded toxin and antitoxin
form a stable complex, inhibiting the toxin and thereby
preventing the deleterious effects on the host cell. Fur-
thermore, the toxin-antitoxin complex binds to the
antitoxin-toxin promoter region and represses the transcrip-
tion of the antitoxin and toxin genes [98–101]. Since the
antitoxin is less stable than the toxin, a ‘point of no return’
can be reached under stress conditions, resulting in growth
inhibition and, eventually, cell death [96, 97, 102, 103].
Several teams in the iGEM competition have tried to
apply the principle of natural type II TA systems to syn-
thetic biosafety systems (Table 1). Team Paris Bettencourt
2012 [104] used a Col E2 toxin and Col E2 antitoxin,
encoded on two different plasmids (BBa_K914001,
BBa_K914002). Two separate plasmids were used to allow
directed degradation of the antitoxin plasmid through a
dedicated restriction enzyme system, hence switching on
the kill switch.
Team Wageningen UR 2014 [105] used a similar system
based on two plasmids. The team applied a combination
of the Kis-Kid (BBa_K1493601) and the Epsilon-Zeta
(BBa_K1493603) systems to prohibit HGT. Therefore,
while the Kis antitoxin and the Zeta toxin were encoded
on one plasmid, the Kid toxin and the Epsilon antitoxin
were encoded on the other plasmid, creating an inter-
dependent system. In case one plasmid is transferred to a
wildtype cell, the analogous antitoxin for the toxin
featured on the plasmid is not present, thus killing the
recipient.
Team UC Berkeley 2008 [106] used a type II TA system
and combined it with a lysozyme (BBa_K112808). The
team used holin and antiholin as the toxin-antitoxin pair
under control of two separate promoters. While the
antiholin is expressed constitutively, expression of the
lysozyme and holin is controlled by an inducible pro-
moter. As soon as holin forms pores in the inner mem-
brane, the lysozyme can reach the periplasm and lyse the
cell. This system was not designed by the team for bio-
safety purposes but could be easily adapted for that role.
Fig. 1 GeneGuard as an example for a modular, multilayered biosafety system [32]. The plasmid system uses conditional origins of replication,
auxotrophies and TA systems. Replication initiators are provided in trans by the host, minimizing the risk of replication in unintended hosts. The
host lacks the essential genes thyA or dapA which are located on the plasmid, making the plasmid essential for cell survival. As a third layer the
TA systems Epsilon-Zeta or Kis-Kid were used to kill the cells after losing the plasmid
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Type II TA systems have also been extensively applied
outside of the iGEM competition. Stirling and colleagues
built two evolutionary stable kill switches to control the
environment in which a genetically engineered strain of
E. coli can survive [107]. Their “essentializer” kill switch
is based on a bi-stable cI/Cro memory switch. Cell death
is induced by loss of the memory switch. The “cryo-
death” kill switch was built around a cold-inducible pro-
motor, allowing growth at 37 °C. At a temperature of
22 °C and below, a survival ratio of less than 10− 5 was
reached (Table 2). Both kill switches were engineered
using the type II TA system CcdB-CcdA [107].
While type I and type II systems are based on interac-
tions of two components of the same kind to mediate in-
hibition either via RNA or protein toxin-antitoxin
complexes, type III systems are based on the interaction
of antitoxin RNA with the toxin protein [108, 109]. To
our knowledge, only one example for a type III TA
system has been identified so far: ToxIN from Erwinia
carotovora subsp. atroseptica which acts as an abortive
infection system [108, 110]. No iGEM team has applied
this type III TA system as a biosafety system yet.
Recently, type IV and V TA systems have been identi-
fied. In type IV systems like yeeU-yeeV, the antitoxin and
toxin do not form a complex. Instead, the antitoxin acts as
an antagonist. While YeeV inhibits the assembly of FtsZ
and MreB filaments, YeeU promotes the reaction, hence
counteracting the toxicity of YeeV [111]. Type V TA systems
like ghoS-ghoT also function without formation of a toxin-
antitoxin complex. GhoS possesses a sequence-specific
endoribonuclease activity, cleaving the GhoT mRNA,
thereby inhibiting formation of the toxin protein [112].
Many teams in the iGEM competition used toxins
under control of specific promoters without a correspond-
ing antitoxin to create biosafety systems (Table 1). Team
LMU Munich 2012 [113] created a kill switch for Bacillus
subtilis to kill germinating spores (BBa_K823044): the
team placed mazF under control of PydfG. This promoter
is activated by the sigma factor of RNA polymerase ECF41
which is produced during sporulation, thus the team cre-
ated a sporulation-induced kill switch. Team TU Eindho-
ven 2014 [114] proposed a timer-coupled kill switch based
on the oscillating concentration of phosphorylated Spo0A
protein (Spo0AP). Once a certain concentration of
Spo0AP is reached, expression of a toxic gene under the
control of a Spo0AP-sensitive promoter will be induced,
leading to cell death.
The ribonuclease ba of Bacillus amyloliquefaciens
(barnase) and the corresponding inhibitor barstar are
sometimes referred to as a toxin-antitoxin system when
combined [95]. Whilst the organization of barstar and
barnase genes differ from the organization of natural
toxin and antitoxin systems, the combination of barnase
and barstar exhibits many similarities to natural
TA-systems. For biosafety applications, the inhibitor
gene barstar is usually integrated in the chromosome
and constitutively expressed. Barnase is encoded on a
plasmid, preferably under control of an inducible or re-
pressible promoter. Furthermore, the fusion of the
barnase to secretion signals like that of PhoA allows the
Table 2 Escape frequencies of selected biosafety systems
Name of the System Type of System Escape Frequency Reference
SLiDE, single allele Auxotrophy 8 × 10− 4 to 3 × 10− 9 [69]
SLiDE, two alleles Auxotrophy 5 × 10− 10 [69]
SLiDE, three alleles Auxotrophy < 3 × 10− 11 [69]
Thymine/Thymidine auxotrophy Auxotrophy Below detection limit [71, 72]
Artificial Phosphite Dependency Auxotrophy 1.94 × 10− 13 [70]
Single ncAA auxotrophy Auxotrophy/Xenobiology No escape mutants in >5 × 1011 cells [381]
Triple ncAA auxotrophy Auxotrophy/Xenobiology 6.41 × 10−11 [57]
CcdB Kill switch ~ 10− 3 [28]
Cryodeath Kill switch < 1 in 105 after 10 days in vivo [107]
Deadman Kill switch Below detection limit [28]
Passcode Kill switch Below detection limit [28]
CRISPR mediated DNA degradation DNA destruction Viable cells reduced by a factor of 108 [152]
Thermoinduced DNA degradation DNA destruction 2 × 10–5 [135]
GeneGuard Combinatorial system Below detection limit [32]
SafeGuard Combinatorial system <1.3 × 10− 12 [76]
In general, the combination of several systems reduces the probability for random mutagenesis to disarm the biosafety system and for cells to bypass the biosafety
system. Therefore, multilayered systems like Passcode, Deadman or GeneGuard act as great examples for complex biosafety systems that achieved very low escape
frequencies. Engineering artificial auxotrophies, such as an artificial phosphite dependency, can also act as potent biosafety systems, as shown by Hirota et al.
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secretion into the periplasm [115–121]. Secreted barnase
can be toxic to bacteria in the proximity of the produ-
cing cells if they do not express the inhibitor barstar, but
the exact mechanism remains unknown [120, 121]. In
combination with another biosafety systems which
represses the expression of barnase through arabinose-
inducible promoter like PBAD, the expression of barnase
can be induced if that biosafety mechanism fails, hence
killing the host cell [122, 123].
Many iGEM teams employed a barnase system, but
only few used it solely for biosafety purposes. Team UC
Berkley 2007 [124] was the first to use the barnase
(BBa_I716211) under control of the promoter PBAD to
induce self-destruction.
Team Bielefeld-Germany 2013 [77] improved the bar-
nase based biosafety system by using it in combination
with a D-alanine auxotrophic strain (Δalr) as a two-part
system (BBa_K1172904). The first part contains the re-
pressor for the promoter of the second part (PBAD) and
the alanine racemase, both under the control of a
rhamnose-inducible promoter (PRha). The second part
contains the PBAD promoter and barnase itself. Should
the first promoter remain inactive due to auxotrophy
failures, barnase is expressed and will lead to cell death.
Team Valencia UPV 2014 [125] aimed to develop a
biosafety module to prevent the spread of genetic
material in plant seeds. The concept was to use barnase
(BBa_I716211) in combination with the tapetum-specific
promoter TA29. Due to time restrictions, this concept
could not be tested.
More complex kill switches like Deadman and Pass-
code (Fig. 2) were recently developed [28]. Both systems
are based on one or multiple synthetic molecules neces-
sary for the cell’s survival. The Deadman switch is based
on mutually reinforcing feedback loops and uses anhy-
drotetracycline (ATc) as the synthetic molecule, which
prevents inhibition of lacI transcription by TetR. LacI
inhibits transcription of the toxin, hence preventing cell
death. Additionally, LacI weakly represses tetR and
strongly represses transcription of the protease Mf-Lon,
which degrades LacI. The group also studied the possi-
bility to use Mf-Lon to degrade an essential protein and
found that a combination of the restriction endonuclease
EcoRI (the toxin) and the degradation of the essential
protein MurC results in survival rates (Table 2) below
the limit of detection. The Passcode switch uses three in-
dependent ‘input signals’ (galactose, cellobiose, IPTG).
Input A (galactose) inhibits GalR-LacI, while input B
(cellobiose) inhibits CelR-LacI. Both GalR-LacI and
CelR-LacI can bind the LacI-ScrR operator, thus inhibit-
ing expression of LacI-ScrR. Expression of the toxin is
repressed by LacI-ScrR, which can be inhibited by input
Fig. 2 Passcode and Deadman kill switches [28]. Both systems are built around synthetic molecules which are necessary for the cell’s survival. a The
Deadman kill switch uses anhydrotetracycline (ATc) as the synthetic molecule and is based on mutually reinforcing feedback loops. ATc prevents inhibition
of lacI by transcription of TetR. Transcription of the toxin is inhibited by LacI, preventing cell death. Furthermore, LacI weakly represses tetR and strongly
represses transcription of the protease Mf-Lon, which degrades LacI. Using a combination of the restriction endonuclease EcoRI (the toxin) and the
degradation of the essential protein MurC by Mf-Lon, the researchers were able to achieve escape frequencies below the limit of detection. b The
Passcode kill switch is based on galactose, cellobiose, and IPTG as three independent ‘input signals’. Input A (galactose) inhibits GalR-LacI, while input B
(cellobiose) inhibits CelR-LacI. Both GalR-LacI and CelR-LacI can bind the LacI-ScrR operator, thus inhibiting expression of LacI-ScrR. LacI-ScrR represses the
expression of the toxin and can be inhibited by input C (IPTG). The cell only survives in presence of galactose and cellobiose and in absence of IPTG.
Escape frequencies below 1 × 10− 6 were reached using EcoRI and Mf-Lon as toxins
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C (IPTG). Therefore, the cell only survives in presence
of galactose and cellobiose and in absence of IPTG.
Using again EcoRI and Mf-Lon as toxins, cell survival ra-
tios below 1 × 10–6 were reached.
Kill switch: DNA destruction
Kill switch systems for GMOs are widely used as bio-
safety systems. But, depending on the TA type (I to V)
used, genetic information can potentially be released and
spread through HGT [26, 32, 126, 127]. Therefore, gen-
etic information has to be released, taken up by another
organism, maintained and expressed [26]. If the uptake
of this genetic information has an evolutionary advan-
tage for the recipient cells, for example the information
for an antibiotic resistance gene, it is likely to remain in
the genome. Thus, genetic incorporation can lead to re-
sistance to antibiotics or other advantages for recipient
cells. Adapting a combination of toxin-antitoxin systems
and self-destruction systems prevents the spread of re-
combinant DNA by the degradation of nucleic acids,
while the targeted cells are killed. Therefore, self-de-
struction can be seen as a special case of a kill switch
system. All systems based on destruction of nucleic acids
can be loosely subdivided into three systems depending
on the sequence specificity of used systems: (i) specific
systems are based on nucleases which hydrolyze nucleic
acids at sequence specific sites known as restriction
sites, (ii) unspecific systems utilize nucleases which
hydrolyze DNA and are not sequence specific and (iii) a
third system which is a combination of sequence specific
and unspecific parts.
Specific systems of self-destruction are toxin-antitoxin sys-
tems based on nucleases applied to kill cells with minor risk
of DNA leakage. Usually, the nuclease (toxin) is encoded on
the plasmid, while the nuclease-methyltransferase (antitoxin)
is encoded on the chromosome. Both nuclease and nuclease-
methyltransferase compete for the same sequence-specific
DNA recognition site. Thus, expression levels between this
toxin-antitoxin gene pairs need to be adjusted. The toxin
is constitutively expressed and the expression of the anti-
toxin is induced, for instance, by using an anhydro-tetra-
cyclin-responsive promoter [76]. When expressed the
nuclease-methyltransferase methylates certain nucleobases
at the recognition site, hence preventing cleavage of the
DNA by the nuclease. This modification prevents
digestion of the cell’s own DNA. A known toxin-antitoxin
system is EcoRI/EcoRI methyltransferase [128–132].
Destruction of the genomic information is initiated by
switching off the expression of the antitoxin-methyl-
transferase. Even if HGT occurs, the recipient cells
are unlikely to counteract the nuclease due to the
lack of methyltransferase.
The team University College London 2012 [133] used
the EcoRI/EcoRI methyltransferase system in their novel
threefold active biological containment system (Table 1)
in combination with holin/anti-holin endolysin and
colicin-E3/colicin Immunity E3 (BBa_K729009, BBa_
K729010). The aim was to minimize HGT via bacterial
conjugation using this new system.
At the end of the last century, genes encoding se-
quence specific restriction nucleases under different pro-
moters were characterized for inducible degradation of
DNA [134]. Stephen Cuskey performed preliminary tests
with EcoRI under control of an inducible promoter as
mentioned by Molin et al. 1993 [134]. Results showed
that growth was reduced due to a high base level of gene
expression without induction. Double strand breaks
caused by EcoRI at a high rate are responsible for slow
growth, as the repair mechanisms are insufficient to fix
them [134].
Nonspecific nucleases, which introduce single strand
breaks, combined with an inducible promoter, a ribo-
some binding-site, and a start codon, appeared to be bet-
ter candidates [134, 135]. Molin and Ahrenholtz both
tested the extracellular nuclease of Serratia marcescens
[134, 135]. The nucA gene encodes a 266 amino acid
long polypeptide with a 21 amino acid long N-terminal
leader peptide [136, 137]. In both cases, the nucA gene
without the leader peptide was under control of an
inducible promoter lac and lambda pL, respectively
[134, 135]. NucA is one example for an unspecific
self-destruction system.
The team TU Munich 2013 [138] used the thermonu-
clease NucA of Staphylococcus aureus (BBa_K1159105) to
degrade DNA of a genetically modified moss (Table 1).
The nuclease (BBa_K1159111) is bound to the membrane
with a transmembrane domain (BBa_K1159315) and con-
tains a TEV cleavage site as well as a SV40 nuclear
localization signal (NLS) (BBa_K1159303). After PhyB
(BBa_K801031) is activated with red light, it binds either
protein PIF3 (BBa_K1159103) or PIF6 (BBa_K1159104).
This binding initiates the assembly of the N- and
C-terminal split TEV protease which in turn cleaves the
TEV cleavage site thus releasing the nuclease; this is trans-
located into the nucleus where the DNA is degraded.
Team NTU-LIHPAO-Taiwan 2015 [139] also used the
thermonuclease NucA of S. aureus (BBa_K1159105)
under control of a lambda cl-regulated promoter
(BBa_R0051) to degrade DNA, thus killing Lactobacillus
casei if the cl protein (BBa_C0051) concentration de-
creased below a certain threshold. The expression of cl
is controlled by the lac-promoter and therefore
regulated by lactose and glucose. The whole system is
hypothetically designed to inhibit HGT from L.casei to
bacteria in the human gastrointestinal tract while con-
trolling the proliferation of the cells.
While sequence specific and unspecific systems may
be of use in general self-destruction, the expression
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controls can be leaky leading to a baseline expression
which is damaging to the cells even if they are con-
tained. Also, both systems are not able to target specific
sites which encode vital enzymes and proteins and are
thus inefficient at mediating cell death. A combinatorial
system of sequence specific and unspecific parts can be
adapted for high-efficiency, easily controllable biosafety.
A self-destruction system which is based on sequence
specific and unspecific parts is the clustered regularly
interspaced short palindromic repeats (CRISPR)/CRISPR
associated (Cas) system - the RNA-mediated adaptive
defense systems of bacteria [140–144] Shortly after its
discovery, it was adapted for genome and transcriptome
editing [145–149]. The sequence-specific CRISPR is used
to guide the sequence-unspecific Cas nuclease to its tar-
get, thus making this system highly regulated without
the risk of uncontrollable cleavage. Employing the same
mechanism on essential and non-essential genes enables
controlled degradation to prevent HGT in the event of
an unintentional release [150–152]. In nature three types
of CRISPR/Cas systems are specified with variations
concerning target and mechanism: type I systems cleave
and degrade DNA; type II systems solely cleave DNA;
and type III systems cleave DNA and RNA [153]. For
the purpose of self-destruction, the type I system is well
suited and frequently employed [151, 152]. Type I and
type II systems are dependent on (i) CRISPR RNA
spacer and target protospacer sequence complementarity
as well as (ii) the protospacer-adjacent motif (PAM)
[154–157]. By combining different Cas proteins and
PAM sequences, a broad range of applications can be
enabled influencing the kinetics of target degradation
[151–153, 158]. Type III systems also require spacer-
protospacer complementarity and specific sequences in
the neighborhood of the protospacer [159]. Specific ON
and OFF states of expression should be defined when
employing the CRISPR/Cas mechanism for degrad-
ation of DNA to ensure induction of expression of
both components in response to specific environmen-
tal changes [152].
Team HKU Hongkong 2015 [160] designed a CRISPR/
Cas9 system with a specific sgRNA (BBa_K1774000) to
target the DNA polymerase III alpha subunit (dnaE)
thus inhibiting replication of the bacteria. The OFF state
was defined by the availability of arabinose and trypto-
phan. Arabinose induced the expression of araC which
in turn induces the expression of cl under control of the
PBAD promoter, thus inhibiting the PR promoter and the
expression of cas9. If available, tryptophan binds to a re-
pressor which in turn blocks the trp promoter and thus
sgRNA expression. In the ON state, arabinose and
tryptophan are not available, which mimics a possible
physical containment breach. A lack of transcriptional
repression results in the formation of Cas9 and the
sgRNA, which can destroy the gene of DNA polymerase
III alpha subunit.
Given that kill switches are prone to inactivating point
mutations [161], especially when constitutively expressed,
researchers have developed new biosafety systems that do
not harm the host, potentially minimizing the risk of unin-
tended proliferation caused by mutagenesis. Jia and col-
leagues developed an orthogonal ribosome biofirewall,
consisting of an activation circuit and a degradation circuit
[162]. The activation circuit, a genetic AND gate, utilizes
an orthogonal ribosome to activate an encrypted pathway
based on specific environmental inputs. The genes encod-
ing the orthogonal ribosome can be degraded by the deg-
radation circuit, a genetic NOT gate, based on a change of
the environmental inputs. This elegant system not only
minimizes the burden on the host, given that the toxin
I-SceI is not constitutively expressed, but also makes ex-
pression of the genes of interest dependent of the pres-
ence of the orthogonal ribosome. Therefore, even if HGT
occurs, expression of the genes of interest is prevent due
to the lack of an orthogonal ribosome. The plasmid con-
taining the genes for the orthogonal ribosome is digested
in absence of specific environmental inputs. This work
highlights how conditional degradation of genetic infor-
mation can be combined with genetic encryption to create
an adaptable and tightly regulated biofirewall for microbial
biocontainment [162].
Xenobiology-based containment
The term ‘xenobiology’ has experienced significant se-
mantic shift over the last few decades [163–165].
Kubyshkin et al. define xenobiology as an approach to
expand the framework of natural chemistries with
non-natural building blocks in living cells to accomplish
artificial biodiversity [50]. Therefore, one key aspect of
xenobiology is the search for alternative chemistry for
nucleic acids, proteins and other cellular components
and functions. Xenobiological systems are also referred
to as orthogonal systems or chemically modified organ-
isms (CMOs) [50, 163]. Current biosafety systems are
meant to kill cells once they escape from the assigned
environment, leaving their recombinant DNA freely
available in nature [166]. An orthogonal system prevents
HGT [167] through transduction [168], conjugation, and
transformation, as reviewed by Davison [169]. As a con-
sequence, wild type cells are unable to integrate and
maintain XNA into their genome and cannot handle the
incorporation of ncAAs [170, 171]. Thus, XNA can
potentially become a powerful biosafety tool by prevent-
ing HGT as it should not be read properly by wild type
DNA processing enzymes like DNA and RNA polymer-
ases [164].
The classification of xenobiology is not consistent.
Some categorize it along with trophic and semantic
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containment for the prevention of metabolic and genetic
exchange [171]. Giving this inconsistency, the following
chapters are categorized according to the components
that could be changed or alienated like the bases, back-
bone, leaving group, codons and amino acids.
Synthetic bases – building up Xeno-DNA
During the emergence of recombinant DNA technology,
a plasmid containing DNA of another species was de-
scribed as Xeno-DNA (XNA) [20]; the modern percep-
tion of XNA describes non-canonical DNA building
blocks or substantial modifications of the natural struc-
ture, such as alternative pairing nucleotides, modified
sugars, or backbones [165, 172, 173]. XNA could be con-
sidered a genetic firewall masking the encoded informa-
tion from nature [163]. The main approach of designing
XNA is to replace or extend the standard genetic code
comprising four naturally occurring nucleotides in the
DNA. There are various sophisticated approaches to
identify potential replacements for the four canonical
bases [174–181]. Nevertheless, advances in XNA tech-
nology have to fulfill some requirements to establish
stable products in vivo [172, 182].
First experiments extended the four nucleotide alpha-
bet by replacing thymine with 5-chlorouracil in E. coli
over a period of 25 weeks [183, 184]. Other approaches
expanded the genetic alphabet by introducing the two
artificial bases dP (2-amino-8-(1′-β-D-2′-deoxyribofura-
nosyl)-imidazol[1,2-α]-1,3,5-trizan-4(H)-one), and dZ
(6-amino-5-nitro-3-(1′-β-D-2′-deoxyribofurano-
syl)-2(1H)-pyridone) [185]. These artificial bases pair
with three hydrogen bonds but vary in the pattern of
donor and acceptor groups. A Taq DNA polymerase was
modified to accept the new ATCGPZ-DNA, resulting in
a retention rate of 98.9% [186, 187]. Moreover, a T7
RNA polymerase and a reverse transcriptase were devel-
oped for an RNA product containing P and Z [188]. The
six nucleotide genetic alphabet will lead to DNA with a
B-form as well as an A-form, with the major groves be-
ing 1 Å wider than the natural G:C pair [189].
Interestingly, the concept of DNA can be extended be-
yond bases and pairing through hydrogen bonds. For ex-
ample, pairings dependent on metal ion coordination
[190–192] or hydrophobic interactions [193] were
explored recently. Two promising candidates using
hydrophobic interactions are d5SICS – dMMO2 and
d5SICS-dNaM, which allowed transcription [193]. The
first demonstration in E. coli was based on one plasmid
encoding the nucleoside triphosphate transporter for
dNaM and d5SICS and the other plasmid encoding a gene
sequence using the extended genetic code [194]. Uptake
of the synthetic bases as well as a stable plasmid replica-
tion over 24 generations was demonstrated [194]. In 2017,
the Romesberg group presented a new version of their
semi-synthetic organism. The most important advances
were an optimized transporter with improved uptake of
unnatural triphosphates and better retention of XNA with
dNaM-dTPT3. Furthermore, they used a CRISPR-Cas sys-
tem to eliminate plasmids that lost the XNA [177].
Besides expanding the alphabet of canonical DNA,
XNA provides the opportunity to change the general
topology. For example, benzo homologation provides the
opportunity to expand the physical DNA size. The benzo
expansion of pyrimidines to create dxT and dxC results
in expanded DNA (xDNA), with the size increasing
about 2.4 Å and the helix becoming more thermally
stable [195, 196]. Stable replication of a plasmid contain-
ing up to eight xDNA bases in a GFP encoding sequence
as well as expression of the altered gfp gene was demon-
strated in E. coli [197]. By further changing the vector of
extension, wide DNA (yDNA) can be obtained [198],
although stable replication of this DNA type is problem-
atic [199].
Use of XNA often necessitates synthetic or evolved
proteins that allow for replication, transcription, and
DNA packaging of the XNA. All presented examples de-
pend on supplementation of the non-canonical nucleo-
tides. This auxotrophy is a potent biosafety mechanism,
which does not just prevent an uncontrolled growth of
the engineered cells in the environment, but also pro-
tects the encoded information from spreading through
HGT [163, 171].
Alternative XNAs: modifying backbone or leaving group
Besides the incorporation of non-canonical bases, exper-
iments to engineer the DNA backbone by integrating
substitutes for deoxyribose and ribose have been per-
formed. For biosafety purposes, an altered backbone
needs to meet the requirement to build a functional
helix that does not interact with natural replication en-
zymes, instead requiring adjusted or even synthetic
enzymes [172]. Some candidates for alternative back-
bone chemistries have previously been investigated as
reviewed by Herdewijn and Marlière [172]; these exam-
ples include: hexitol nucleic acid (HNA) [200], threose
(TNA) [201, 202], glycerol (GNA) [203], and cyclohex-
ene (CeNA) [204]. A less complex method compared to
the substitution of the whole genomic backbone is utiliz-
ing an orthogonal XNA episome which contains essen-
tial genes [172].
Besides the bases and the backbone, the third
potential target to design XNA is alternating the
leaving group of NTPs by replacing the pyrophos-
phate, such that they cannot be recognized by wild
type polymerases. Studied analogues of ATP are
methylene phosphonate, phosphoamidate [205], and
thiophosphonate [206]. An alternative leaving group
needs a high energy bond for the polymerization
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process. Studies on L-aspartate and L-histidine linked
nucleotidemonophosphates showed that aspartic acid
phosphoramidate derivates are working substrates for
the HIV reverse transcriptase [207].
Amber codon and non-canonical amino acids
By systematically expanding the approach of auxotro-
phies based on xenobiotic compounds to utilizing a
whole orthogonal genetic code, e.g. by means of xeno-
biology, the spread of recombinant sequences can also
be prevented. There are three stop codons in the genetic
code: ochre (UAA), opal (UGA) and amber (UAG) [208].
In E. coli, the amber codon is least common, with just
over 300 occurrences (depending on the E. coli strain
used). In 2013, Lajoie and colleagues coined the term
genetically recoded organism (GRO) to describe organ-
isms with an alternative genetic code [209]. Such GROs
have been developed for enhanced biosafety compared
to natural amino acid auxotrophs by engineering organ-
isms to become auxotrophic for non-canonical amino
acids (ncAAs) [58]. Rovner et al. constructed GROs
based on E. coli without any TAG codon and the possi-
bility to terminate translation at the UAA and UAG co-
dons. After recoding the TAG codon to a sense codon
for ncAAs by means of an orthogonal translation system
(OTS), the recoded codon was incorporated into essen-
tial genes of the organism, thus making it dependent on
ncAAs. Sixty variants of the auxotroph-GROs with vary-
ing growth and containment rates have been isolated,
with one strain containing three recoded TAG codons
maintaining stable growth, and undetectable escape fre-
quencies over the course of 1 week or 20 days on solid
or in liquid media, respectively. Changing the amber
codon into a sense codon has been done multiple times
by various groups [210–217], but results in the mistrans-
lation of all genes using this stop codon. Therefore, the
Church lab presented a GRO in which all 314 UAG stop
codons were replaced by UAA stop codons. Deletion of
release factor 1 (encoded by prfA), which recognizes
UAG and UAA, then allows for recoding of the amber
stop codon [218, 219]. Engineering a new aminoacyl-
tRNA synthetase (aaRS) and corresponding tRNA leads
to an orthogonal translation machinery required to har-
ness the potential of an amber-free strain [220]. The
non-canonical amino acid (ncAA) L-4,4′-biphenylala-
nine (BPA) had been integrated via the UAG stop codon
of the GRO E. coli strain C321.ΔA by Mandell et al..
This resulted in auxotrophs designed to be dependent
on ncAAs [57]. Thus, the essential enzymes of the strain
required BPA for core functions, such as translation.
Additionally, in a proof-of-concept study, an E. coli
strain BL21-AI (IY, lamB-immE3) containing the syn-
thetic essential gene immE3 had been constructed, the
translation of which depends on supplementation of the
medium with the non-canonical amino acid 3-iodo-
L-tyrosine [221]. As an alternative to reassigning stop
codons, it is also possible to reassign sense codons to
ncAAs. In order to ensure proper functioning of the al-
tered strain, rarely-used sense codons have been used,
such as the codon AGG, which usually codes for argin-
ine and has been reassigned to code for the ncAA
L-homoarginine in E. coli [222]. Such an approach has
been explored with other sense codons, such as AUG
[223], and as a combination of sense and stop codon re-
assignment [224]. Reassigning single codons is not the
only way to incorporate ncAAs to the genetic code. In-
stead, Hoesl and colleagues [225] have evolved cultures
of E. coli to grow on a non-canonical amino acid alterna-
tive to L-tryptophan (L-β-(thieno[3,2-b]pyrrolyl)alanine)
in a long-term cultivation experiment. While cells were
capable of surviving in the total absence of L-tryptophan,
they were still able to grow when L-tryptophan was
present. In the future, further strain engineering might
provide an evolutionary approach to altered strains
dependent on ncAAs.
The resulting combination of trophic and semantic
containment constitutes a powerful biosafety system.
While not preventing the transfer of genetic material in
the first place, the recoded DNA cannot be expressed
after an HGT event in natural organisms. Moreover,
HGT of sequences encoding an aaRS and the corre-
sponding tRNA are either lethal or very detrimental in
natural, non-recoded organisms as they will lead to mis-
translation of amber containing genes.
In 2006, Wang et al. recoded the amber codon to imple-
ment a non-canonical amino acid. The source organism of
the altered tRNA and aminoacyl tRNA synthetase for
tyrosine was Methanococcus jannaschii [226]. After engin-
eering, this system was able to insert O-methyl-L-tyrosine
in a gene encoding the dihydrofolate reductase. Another
example, based on a translation switch controlled by the
absence of 3-iodo-L-tyrosine [221, 227], is described in
the section on auxotrophy-based systems.
Shifty codes [228] are used to encode the same prod-
uct as expected in the wild type, but are based on
quadruplets and orthogonal ribosomes. The evolution of
orthogonal ribosomes translating a quadruplet code
provides the amazing opportunity to assign 256 blank
codons. Neumann et al. [229] evolved a synthetic ribo-
some (ribo-Q1), whose decoding fidelity was as high as in
wild type ribosomes [230]. They tested the incorporation
of two non-canonical amino acids, p-azido-L-phenylalan-
ine (AzPhe) and N6-[(2-propinyloxy)carbonyl]-L-lysine)
(CAK), encoded by a combination of a quadruplet codon
AGGA and the amber codon UAG in E. coli. The protein
was only completely synthesized when both non-
canonical amino acids were encoded in the DNA
[229, 231, 232].
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Application of xenobiology-based containment in the iGEM
competition
In 2012, team Paris Bettencourt [104] worked on an ex-
tensive biosafety project (Table 1). A semantic contain-
ment part was based on an amber mutation in the gene
conferring kanamycin resistance (BBa_P1003). The
objective was to prevent expression of the antibiotic re-
sistance gene in wild type bacteria cells after a HGT
event. Two parts were constructed to realize the amber
suppression in E. coli MG1655: BBa_K914000 encoding
Plac-supD-T: tRNA amber suppressor and BBa_K914009:
P1003*Ser133 encoding a kanamycin resistance gene with
one amber mutation at a serine residue at position 133.
The team demonstrated that the amber codon was ef-
fectively recoded. The growth rate and level of resistance
were not significantly decreased compared to the strain
carrying the original kanamycin resistance gene as well
as the tRNA amber suppressor. However, the culture
without the tRNA amber suppressor reached a higher
OD600 value, because other amber stop codons on the
chromosome were also suppressed. Interestingly, they
found that a single amber mutation was quickly over-
come by mutations, a problem that could be addressed
by introducing a second amber mutation in the kanamy-
cin resistance gene. Thus, amber codons within anti-
biotic resistances are an effective way to prevent the easy
spread of such resistances. However, further improve-
ments of the system are needed to prevent the HGT of
the amber suppressing tRNA.
The team TU Darmstadt 2016 [233] combined auxo-
trophic incorporation of a non-canonical amino acid and
a reporter for low levels of the ncAA (BBa_K1416000,
BBa_K1976025) [234] designed by the team Austin
Texas 2014 [235]. Amber codons were placed at the be-
ginning of a Colicin E2 immunity protein [236] and the
mutated Zif23-GCN4 repressor (F4OMT), a dimeric
Cis2His2 zinc finger protein [237]. In case of the ab-
sence of the ncAA, both proteins cannot be translated,
resulting in expression of the reporter system mVenus
[238] under control of a Zif23-GCN4-controlled pro-
moter and subsequent initiation of the suicide reaction.
However, no results were reported on the expression of
the reporter and the OMT-RS expression under a T7
promoter (BBa_K525998).
Team Bielefeld-CeBiTec 2017 worked on expanding the
genetic code with the unnatural base pair formed between
isoguanosine (isoG) and 5-methyl-isocytosine (isoCm), and
non-canonical amino acids [239]. The team used CRISPR/
Cas9 to retain the unnatural base pair in a specified se-
quence. Furthermore, the algae transporter PtNTT2 was
used to facilitate uptake of the unnatural nucleoside tri-
phosphates. Given that this transporter can also facilitate
transport of ATP, it may also be used to engineer an artifi-
cial ATP auxotrophy. By recoding the amber codon, the
team incorporated ncAAs in a number of proteins. Culti-
vations showed growth defects if the desired ncAA was
not supplemented. The cells were still able to grow as the
aaRS, with lower affinity, also incorporated endogenous
amino acids. Therefore, engineering artificial ncAA auxot-
rophies requires highly specific aaRS.
Minimal genome
Sometimes referred to as the “holy grail” of synthetic biol-
ogy [240–243] the minimal genome is defined as a set of
genes which are essential for survival of the cell [244] in
an environment containing all required supplements for
life [240]. The size of a minimal genome depends on the
surrounding environment [245]. Therefore, the sets of re-
quired genes differ slightly as reviewed by Gil and col-
leagues [246]. Most approaches rely on transposon
mutagenesis [247] or antisense RNA [248, 249] to identify
essential genes [250]. Nevertheless, it is hard to determine
the minimal set of essential genes, since an essential func-
tion might be encoded by two or more genes, thus result-
ing in false negative assignments [245, 251].
Minimal genomes can be constructed via “top down”
or “bottom up” approaches, with “top down” being the
systematic deletion of redundant genes, while “bottom
up” describes the synthesis and assembly of a genome
with the minimal set of genes [252]. Numerous, sophisti-
cated attempts were made to identify essential genes of
an organism in order to construct a minimal genome of
Haemophilus influenzae [253], H. influenza and
Streptococcus pneumoniae [254], Mycoplasma genitalium
[255, 256] S. aureus [249], Buchnera spp. [257], Saccha-
romyces cerevisiae [258], Corynebacterium glutamicum
[259] and E. coli [260–262].
In M. genitalium, which had the smallest known gen-
ome at that time [263], global mutagenesis led to the
identification of 265 essential genes [256] which aligns
well with the published predicted minimal genome con-
sisting of 256 genes [264]. An 1.08 Mbp synthetic gen-
ome sequence of M. mycoides was assembled and
transplanted into an M. capricolum recipient cell produ-
cing M. mycoides JCVI-syn1.0 [265]. Latest research has
led to the development of a minimal genome of M.
mycoides called JCVI-syn3.0 [245]. Based on
JCVI-syn1.0, the genome reduction was achieved in
2016 in the new synthetic 532 kbp genome of
JCVI-syn3.0 [245]. It contains the minimal set of essen-
tial genes, although the function of 149 genes remained
unknown. Further reduction processes identified quasi
essential genes, which were not required for survival,
but contributed significantly to stable growth [245]. Cells
with a reduced genome showed a duplication time of
180 min, which is substantially different to the duplica-
tion time of 60 min of JCVI-syn1.0 with a gene set for
robust growth [245].
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A bacterial cell with a minimal genome offers various
applications in biosafety. The cells would depend on
complex media as well as on stable conditions. There-
fore, survival in a natural environment with fluctuations
in environmental conditions is improbable. However,
HGT is still an issue in this scenario, which is why we
recommend aiming for a combination with self-destruc-
tion systems as described above.
Since the iGEM competition is about the construction
of plasmid-based BioBricks, the development of a min-
imal genome would be challenging for the teams. Still,
teams like Alberta 2009 [266], ETH Zurich 2008 [267],
and UESTC 2015 [268] developed concepts and imple-
mented software to identify minimal gene sets based on
bacterial genome sequences.
Cell-free systems
The main concerns from a biosafety perspective are the
possible release of GMOs into the environment and
HGT between engineered and wild type organisms.
Cell-free protein synthesis (CFPS) represents a promis-
ing possibility to eliminate most of these risks. The first
researchers to show that disrupted bacterial cells can be
used for in vitro protein synthesis were Gale and Folkes
in 1954 [269]. In 1961, Nirenberg and Matthaei con-
ducted pioneering work using E. coli cells and showed
that template RNA is a requirement for cell-free protein
synthesis [270]. CFPS is feasible for a variety of applica-
tions, including synthetic biology, vaccine production
and protein engineering [271–273].
There are two main strategies for CFPS. The first,
older one is based on crude cell extracts from the
desired cells. While the necessary crude extracts are easy
to prepare, fast energy depletion and degradation by pro-
teases and nucleases pose two major problems [274–276].
To counter those problems, the PURE (“protein synthesis
using recombinant elements”) system developed by Shi-
mizu et al. 2001 [276] can be used. This cell-free system is
based on purified (His)-tagged translation factors and can
be programmed by natural mRNA. For biosafety reasons,
it is important to effectively remove all living cells before
deploying a CFPS system outside of the lab. While stand-
ard methods for the preparation of cell-extracts are
already highly effective, they still do not provide a
completely cell-free extract [277, 278]. Protocols based on
sterile filtration and lyophilization can provide a much
more sterile extract, minimizing the risk of accidental re-
lease of genetically modified organisms into the environ-
ment [278]. To fully circumvent the risk of an unsterile
cell-extract, the aforementioned PURE system can be de-
ployed. This system is not only safer, but also has lower
energy consumption relative to S30 cell extract systems
(cell extracts cleared from heavier components by centri-
fugation at 30,000 xg), with greater productivity. However,
Shimizu et al. could not top the productivity of
400 μg/ml with a S30 extract when they first pub-
lished their results [276, 279].
Several iGEM teams used cell-free systems for their
projects. Bielefeld-CeBiTec 2015 (Table 1) used cell ex-
tracts of E. coli KRX and ER2566 strains to produce
sfGFP as part of a paper-based biosensor [280]. Both
strains feature low endogenous protease activity and a
chromosomally integrated T7 polymerase. To create a
cell extract, the team harvested the cells at mid-to-late
exponential growth phase and sonicated the cells as
described by Kwon and Jewett [281]. Using this system,
the team successfully produced sfGFP in vitro on a
paper strip.
Teams Edinburgh 2015 and Exeter 2015 also tried to
build a biosensor using cell-free protein synthesis. Edin-
burgh used E. coli BL21 to express the desired enzymes
fused to cellulose-binding domains. The cells were
freeze-dried to obtain an extract containing the enzymes
which were then immobilized on paper to create a
paper-based drug testing biosensor [282]. Exeter 2015
developed a biosensor for the detection of bovine tuber-
culosis. The team used a commercially available S30
cell-free kit to express GreenFET1J as a response to the
trigger RNA [283].
Team Freiburg 2015 tried to build a microchip for
simultaneous detection of several infectious diseases
[284]. The team used an E. coli lysate in a microfluidic
chamber and expressed HA- and (His)-tagged GFP as
well as luciferase as a proof of concept. Their final goal
was to express disease-specific antigens like the Clostrid-
ium tetani antigen, however even after optimization,
antigen production could not be detected.
In 2017, team Lethbridge worked on a standardized,
modular system for CFPS with their project ‘next vivo’
[285]. The design of the system was based on standard-
ized expression and purification of all proteins required
for transcription and translation, the ribosomes, as well
as the necessary tRNAs. The team aimed to overexpress
all 38 essential proteins required for transcription and
translation in E. coli BL21-Gold (DE3) to subsequently
pool and co-purify all components. The team success-
fully overexpressed and purified key proteins required
for CFPS and succeeded in purifying tRNAPhe as a proof
of concept. Additionally, the team hypothesized the use
of a modified codon table as a biocontainment strategy
for CFPS.
Physical containment
While biological strategies have strengthened biocon-
tainment, most strategies, especially in industry, are cen-
tered around physical containment [56]. We define
physical containment as the separation of cells from the
environment by means of physical materials e.g. the wall
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of a bioreactor [23]. Physical containment acts as a pre-
emptive strategy intended to prevent the release of
GMOs and includes the design of equipment as well as
facilities used [56]. Besides “classical” full containment
systems like bioreactors, cell retainment systems which
allow the exchange of small molecules, e.g. micro encap-
sulation, enable a broad range of applications [286–289].
In theory, cells should secrete their product, e.g. neuro-
transmitter [290, 291], continuously over a long-time
period. However, this mechanism requires expensive
viability controls and the development of mechanisms to
prevent unintended release of bacteria from capsules
[292]. Stability of encapsulation can be increased by che-
lating compounds, anti-gelling cations like Na+ and Mg2
+ or polymers [293, 294].
The survival rate of cells in silica gels as encapsulating
substance [295–297] reached 55% living cells after 4
weeks by adding glycerol as osmotic stabilizer [298]. The
specific advantage of silica gels is their action as physical
barriers between the cells, preventing cell aggregation
and thus physical interaction between cells [298]. Al-
though there is a mechanical and chemical stability of
silica gels which ensure entrapment of cells, silica gels
are still not as stable as polymer gels [299–301].
Since iGEM applications are often targeting environ-
mental problems or offer applications for daily use, the
development of solutions for encapsulated cells is a
pressing need. Such physical containment strategies
were applied by Paris Saclay 2015 to embed bacteria in
silica beads [302]. They developed a novel protocol
based on two publications [303, 304] which remains to
be tested.
Paris Bettencourt 2012 worked on alginate beads for
application with E. coli, based on a study with S. cerevi-
siae [305], using glutaraldehyde as a cross-linker [104].
This compound is toxic to unprotected cells but can be
used together with polyethyleneimine to stabilize the
cells within the alginate beads. Blue white staining was
applied to demonstrate the viability of encapsulated E.
coli cells. The stabilized beads showed a 1000-fold
reduced cell-release rate. This was demonstrated by cul-
tivating cells entrapped by both types of beads for 24 h
followed by streaking out the supernatant on agar plates
to quantify the number of released cells.
Sensors
In a broader sense, physical containment can be under-
stood also as the containment by physical parameters
like temperature or light. These parameters are suitable
as they are usually well controlled in a bioreactor. In
addition, a number of control systems can be found in
many organisms, as living cells must adapt to changes in
the temperature and light condition of their environ-
ment. By sensing these (or other) environmental
conditions, release of bacterial cells from a controlled
environment can be linked to other biosafety systems,
like kill switches.
Temperature
Depending on the organism, release from the physical
containment might result in either a heat or cold shock
which could be used to differentiate between growth in
a temperature-controlled environment like a bioreactor
or in a natural environment, respectively [306, 307].
As many organisms encounter (sometimes drastic)
changes in temperature in nature, a wide variety of sen-
sors and response systems have evolved in bacteria and
other organisms. For example, over 100 proteins were
previously described to be involved in the heat shock
response of E. coli [308–310]. Most of these proteins
function as molecular chaperons or proteases, which
preserve the protein structures, membrane homeostasis
or nucleic acid topology [308–310]. On the other hand,
cold shock proteins (CSPs) allow to tolerate low temper-
atures by maintaining efficient translation of RNA and
membrane fluidity [311, 312]. Another group of proteins
are methyl-accepting chemotaxis proteins (MCPs) which
are involved in temperature-dependent changes in the
movement of E. coli. Of these Tsr, Tar and Trg were de-
scribed to detect heat shock temperatures while Tap
detected low temperatures [313–316].
A more direct level of temperature-based control is re-
alized on the DNA and RNA levels. For example, tran-
scription efficiency is dependent on the DNA topology,
especially on the level of supercoiling [317–319] which
can increase or decrease due to temperature stress [320].
Another common control mechanism that has been rec-
ognized is on the level of RNA in the form of ribos-
witches. These elements are usually located within the
5′-UTR of protein encoding genes [321] and control
protein biosynthesis through temperature-mediated
structural changes [322–324]. They usually consist of
temperature unstable hairpin loops [325], but more so-
phisticated RNA structures like the pseudo knot struc-
ture of the cspA transcript [326] are also known. The
typical mode of action of these ‘RNA thermometers’ is
sequestration of the RBS by hairpin formation which
is released at elevated temperatures [327]. Beside
cis-acting RNA molecules, at least one trans-acting
RNA has been described: DsrA affects the expression
of other genes through modulation of translation of
rpoS, encoding the non-essential sigma factor of RNA
polymerase in E. coli, at low temperatures by binding
to the rpoS transcript, releasing the otherwise seques-
tered RBS [328–330].
Promising work has been done on the integration of
riboswitches into biosafety systems regarding gene ex-
pression [331, 332]. Dedicated non-coding RNA
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molecules were frequently applied to measure tempera-
tures in vivo [333–335]. Multiple examples of
temperature sensing RNA molecules integrated as key
part of a biosafety system were presented by iGEM
teams during the last years (Table 1) [30, 31]. Team
Paris Saclay 2015 applied the RNA-based temperature
sensor technology to set upper (42 °C) and lower (32 °C)
temperature boundaries for growth of E. coli [302]. The
RNA molecule ROSE [336] from Bradyrhizobium japo-
nicum [337] was proposed to control the expression of
three essential genes in E. coli. Genes encoding the
tRNA synthetases for alanine, tyrosine and methionine
as well as the DNA polymerase III subunit delta might
be good targets for conditional expression [262]. Other
potential targets, which are essential, non-redundant and
constitutively expressed, include adenylate kinase (adk)
[338], alanyl-tRNA synthethase [339], DNA polymerase
III subunit delta (holB) [340], methionyl-tRNA synthe-
tase (metG) [341], phosphoglycerate kinase (pgk) [342],
and tyrosyl-tRNA synthetase (tyrS) [343].
The native promoter sequences of three essential
genes were substituted with a repressor-controlled tet
promoter (Ptet) [344]. ROSE was applied to control the
expression of the TetR repressor to indirectly regulate
the expression of all three tRNA synthetases. Since
ROSE inhibits translation of the controlled mRNA below
30 °C [336], E. coli is only able to grow above this
temperature when the Tet repressor is translated. The
cI gene from bacteriophage λ was applied to achieve
an upper growth limit, which may be important for
applications involving thermotolerant or thermophilic
bacteria. While an upper restrictive temperature is
not necessary for application in most environments,
the concept of producing a stenoecious (insensitive to
environmental factors) organism by synthetic biology
is very interesting.
Another good example is the use of the RNA molecule
FourU from Salmonella entericaserovar Typhimurium
M556 [345] (BBa_K115002) by the iGEM teams TU
Delft 2008 [346] as well as NCTU Formosa 2011 [347].
Expression of essential genes is controlled by this
temperature-sensing RNA molecule, permitting the E.
coli cells to grow only at 37 °C. Growth at lower
temperature is inhibited by the formation of a stable
RNA hairpin structure which prevents the translation of
essential genes [345]. Growth at higher temperatures is
not possible, since the high temperature is detrimental
to E. coli. Functionality of this part was demonstrated
via Renilla reniformis luficerase [348] and GFP [349]
respectively, serving as reporter genes.
Light-regulated gene expression
Light exposure is a major difference between the con-
trolled environment within a bioreactor and the natural
environment. Therefore, light sensors [350, 351] might
be applicable in microbial biosafety systems when
coupled to kill switches or other previously described
systems.
One way for perception of light in bacteria are LOV
photoreceptors [352] based on flavine nucleotides as chro-
mophores [353]. A synthetic biology approach replaces
the oxygen-sensing module of the histidine kinase FixL
[354] of B. japonicum [355] with the LOV photo sensor
module of YtvA from B. subtilis [356]. The resulting histi-
dine kinase YF1 can be inhibited by blue light. The com-
bination of the response regulator FixJ of B. japonicum
[357] and YF1 forms a synthetic two component system.
This system controls the FixK2 promoter [355] allowing
light-dependent repression of genes under PfixK2 control
[352], realized on the plasmid pDusk [358, 359]. For bio-
safety purposes, the opposite behavior is usually desired,
requiring the use of an inverter. A ready to use sys-
tem is available via the plasmid pDawn which uses a
Yf1-FixJ-downregulated cI as well as a cI-repressed PR
upstream of the gene(s) of interest [358, 359]. Despite
the availability of BioBricks, only a few iGEM teams
have proposed to use this system for biosafety. To
our knowledge, no team has so far successfully used
the system for this purpose.
Phytochromes are another type of a membrane-bound
extracellular sensor for light detection which regulate
transcription via intracellular response regulators [360].
A synthetic biology approach involves the fusion of this
photoreceptor and an intracellular E. coli histidine kin-
ase domain [361]. This system is based on the
EnvZ-OmpR two component system of E. coli which is
involved in porin expression upon osmotic shock [362].
The chimera protein was constructed by replacing EnvZ
with the phytochrome Cph1 of Synechocystis sp. PCC
6803 [363, 364]. The light-sensing receptor part (phyco-
cyanobilin) is not produced in E. coli wildtype. However,
phycocyanobilin biosynthesis can be achieved in E. coli
by introducing the genes ho1 (BBa_I15008) und pcyA
(BBa_I15009) of Synechocystis sp. PCC6803 resulting in
conversion of haem into phycocyanobilin [365, 366].
The chimeric protein Cph8 (encoded by BBa_I15010) re-
acts to light input with a strong response. This systems
allows expression of the target gene(s) in the dark to be
inactivated by red light [361].
The teams of Uppsala 2011 [367] and Cornell 2011
[368] conceptualized light-dependent biosafety systems.
Green light was used by the Cornell team to trigger the
expression of a lysis cassette. As green light is absent
under normal cultivation conditions, this system should
kill all cells outside a bioreactor. Cornell 2011 planned
the combination of ccaS and ccaR on one plasmid in
combination with the phycocyaobilin biosynthesis genes
ho1 and pcyA (BBa_K597105).
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Conclusion
We reviewed a broad spectrum of biosafety mechanisms
and have highlighted promising achievements within the
iGEM competition (Table 1). Auxotrophies, kill switches,
mechanisms for self-destruction, and semantic as well as
physical containment are important categories of
orthogonal biosafety systems. Moreover, cell-free ap-
proaches provide biosafety to synthetic biology by avoid-
ing living cells.
Despite these sophisticated mechanisms, responsible
and careful handling of genetically engineered bacteria is
the first step and most efficient way to ensure biosafety.
However, in the case of an accidental release of genetic-
ally engineered bacteria, several mechanisms should be
in place to prevent the spread of the engineered cells or
their genetic information. It is important to emphasize
that genetic components, process conditions and manu-
facturing design can all contribute to biocontainment
and should therefore be taken into consideration to fur-
ther increase the degree of biosafety [56]. Most standard
safety strains are only based on auxotrophies, designed
to prohibit growth in absence of one specific compound.
Even if genetically modified cells are not able to survive
in the environment, the presence of recombinant genetic
information still provides opportunities for HGT. As any
single biosafety system might fail with roughly the prob-
ability of a point mutation (10− 7) [369, 370], a combin-
ation of multiple systems can increase the safety in a
linear way (Fig. 3). Therefore, it is important to combine
orthogonal types of biosafety mechanisms within one
cell [32, 76], resulting in safer, more sophisticated, syn-
thetic biosafety systems. Such systems can be combined
within one cell, as highlighted in (Fig. 4).
Calculating the worse-case probability, we assume only
a linear safety increase which would require five differ-
ent systems to reach a failure probability of 10− 35. Since
recent estimations assume the presence of only about
1030 cells on earth [371], one could consider such a
combined system as sufficiently safe for a single applica-
tion. To achieve a high level of biosafety, several systems
preventing HGT as well as VGT should be combined as
each system might fail with a certain probability (Fig. 3,
Table 2). However, it is important to keep in mind that
the number of synthetic biology applications will in-
crease significantly in the near future. Like the correc-
tion for multiple testing in statistics, the failure
probability of biosafety systems in the future should be
adjusted in accordance to the number of parallel applica-
tions. Therefore, a general awareness of potential risks
associated with this technology is crucial. Whilst the
number of early stage researchers utilizing methods of
synthetic biology has increased through the iGEM
competition, the teams have regularly conceptualized
and successfully implemented novel biosafety systems
(Table 1). The awareness for this topic seems to be
higher than in general research. A dedicated biosafety
track could support this development and facilitate the
submission of well characterized biosafety BioBricks to
the iGEM Registry of Standard Biological Parts. Further-
more, since only the submission of parts (not the
submission of engineered strains) to the Registry of
Standard Parts is possible, iGEM teams are limited to
the construction of plasmid-based biosafety devices.
Enabling a controlled strain distribution alongside the
BioBrick collection could facilitate the invention of even
more sophisticated systems.
So, what comes next? Given that biotechnology is be-
coming more and more established in industry, complex
biosafety systems that can efficiently prevent vertical as
well as HGT are of high interest. Furthermore, GMOs
designed to be deployed in open environments pose new
biosafety challenges. An example for such applications
can include the possible use of engineered microbes for
bioremediation of chemically polluted areas [372, 373].
Given that the technological advancements over the last
decades have led to a much deeper understanding of
Fig. 3 Biosafety defense level. Assuming that physical containment
fails, and the engineered bacteria escape their designated
environment (e.g. a bioreactor), there are two ways possibly leading
to a total biosafety system collapse. A biosafety collapse happens
once either HGT or VGT (reproduction) occurs. Therefore, transfer of
genetic information from the engineered cell to a wildtype cell can
only occur if all mechanisms preventing either HGT or VGT,
respectively, fail
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cellular biology and regulatory processes, it is likely that
novel and more advanced biosafety approaches will be
developed in the near future. Especially cell-free xeno-
biological systems would be of high interest as potential
high-fidelity synthetic biosafety systems. Novel synthetic
biosafety systems could even allow for safer deployment
of GMOs in open environments.
In the future, we propose the construction of custom-
ized safety strains by harnessing the extensive knowledge
collected through genome sequencing and functional an-
notation projects. On the one hand, pathway mapping
could be used to find target genes which might circum-
vent certain auxotrophies. On the other hand, the identi-
fication of bottle necks in essential pathways for
generating novel auxotrophies is feasible now. Moreover,
basic research e.g. about mechanisms of HGT and
bacterial evolution is needed to quantify the safety of
previously described mechanisms more precisely.
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